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ABSTRACT
In three of the major right to marry cases in which the plaintiffs
challenged their domicile’s refusal to permit them to marry, the couples
had married in a sister state in accord with local law. In none of these
cases did the Court address the conditions under which states, as a
constitutional matter, must recognize marriages validly celebrated in
another state. This article argues that the position reflected in the First
and Second Restatements of the Conflicts of Law captures the United
States Constitution’s approach. A marriage valid in the states of
celebration and domicile at the time of its celebration must be recognized
throughout the country, contrary policy of the forum state
notwithstanding. In addition, the article discusses both the conditions
under which states must permit the enjoyment of the incidents of
marriage, and some of the changes in state law that would be necessary
were the Court to expressly adopt the position advocated here.
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INTRODUCTION
Three of the major right-to-marry cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court—Loving v. Virginia,1 Zablocki v. Redhail,2 and
Obergefell v. Hodges3—implicated an issue that nevertheless remains
unresolved: under what conditions does the Constitution require
marriages validly celebrated in one state to be recognized by all other
states? In each of these cases, the Court struck down a state’s contested
marriage prohibition, which removed the conflict between that state’s
law and the laws of other states who allowed such marriages, and
thereby allowed the Court to avoid determining how such conflicts
should be resolved.
Merely because no conflicts were posed in these cases, however,
does not mean that conflicts never arise. On the contrary, states have
long been forced to develop approaches to deciding whether to
recognize marriages validly celebrated elsewhere that nonetheless
contravene local law. As one example, a state of domicile might be
forced to decide whether to recognize a marriage between individuals
too closely related by blood according to that state’s law,4 even though
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
4. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing whether to
recognize a marriage between first cousins, which was valid in the state of celebration (Tennessee)
but prohibited in the state of domicile (Indiana)); see also Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206
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such marriages are permitted in the state of celebration.5 The
Restatements (First and Second) of the Conflicts of Law provide
guidance as to how such matters should be resolved.6 However, the
Court has never explicitly addressed whether the Restatements’ basic
approach is constitutionally required, forcing lower courts to interpret
the Constitution’s limits and resulting in the adoption of inconsistent
approaches among jurisdictions.7 The Court’s implicit position is that
the Restatements’ approach, with a few important modifications,
reflects the marriage recognition requirements of the Constitution.8
Part I of this article discusses the fundamental right to marry, as well
as the conditions under which states will choose to recognize marriages
validly celebrated elsewhere. This Part also discusses the constitutional
limitations placed on states in deciding whether to recognize the
validity of a marriage celebrated elsewhere, as well as whether to
prohibit couples married elsewhere from enjoying the incidents of
marriage. Part II applies the constitutional limitations discussed in Part
I, demonstrating how these limitations render some state laws and
practices unconstitutional and hence unenforceable. The article
concludes by arguing that the Court should explicitly recognize the
constitutional constraints it has implicitly endorsed. Doing so would
manifest appropriate respect for both state sovereignty and the
fundamental interest in marriage, promote certainty about marital
(Ohio 1958) (discussing whether to recognize a first cousin marriage valid in the state of
celebration (Massachusetts) but prohibited in the state of domicile (Ohio)).
5. The state where the couple celebrates their marriage is the state of celebration, see
Christopher S. Krimmer, Federal Benefits for Married Same-Sex Couples, 87 WIS. LAW. 39, 40
(Jan. 2014) (describing the “place of celebration” as “the jurisdiction in which the marriage took
place or was celebrated”), while the state where the couple is living and plans to remain
permanently is the state of domicile, see MAUREEN MCBRIEN & PATRICIA A. KINDREGAN, THE
MEANING OF DOMICILE IN DIVORCE PRACTICE, 2 MASS. PRAC., FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 29:2 (4th ed.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19(a) (AM. LAW
INST. 1971) [hereafter SECOND RESTATEMENT] (noting that “a domicil, once established,
continues until a new one is acquired”).
6. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 121, 131, 132 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)
[hereafter FIRST RESTATEMENT]; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283.
7. Compare Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 976 (Md. 2012) (“Generally, Maryland courts will
honor foreign marriages as long as the marriage was valid in the state where performed.”) with
Oliver v. Stufflebeam, 155 So. 3d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding state refusal to
recognize same-sex marriage validly celebrated in another domicile) and Mabry v. Mabry, 882
N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. 2016) (McCormack, J., dissenting) (“Until 2015, same-sex couples were
not permitted to marry in Michigan. Nor did Michigan recognize a legal marriage between
a same-sex couple solemnized in another jurisdiction.”).
8. Cf. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (“Marriages not polygamous or
incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the state where
entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.”). Here, the Court does not make
clear whether it is describing a state practice or a constitutional mandate. Id.
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status, and remove the guesswork about whether citizens would be
sacrificing their marriages when visiting or moving to a particular state.
I. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION RIGHTS
The right to marry involves a fundamental interest, and the United
States Constitution constrains the power of states to prohibit marriage
on certain bases. However, states continue to differ with respect to
certain regulations, e.g., who is barred from marrying because too
closely related by affinity or consanguinity.9 A couple who marries in
accord with local law might think twice about moving to or visiting a
state which bars their marriage, fearing that were some accident to
occur in the latter state, the two would be treated as legal strangers and
thus unable to avail themselves of the special status accorded to
spouses when making hospital visits or health care decisions.10 Such a
couple might want to know before going within a state’s borders the
conditions, if any, under which their marriage would not be recognized.
States have adopted their own approaches to deciding which
marriages that could not be celebrated locally will nonetheless be
recognized; those approaches are reflected in the Restatements (First
and Second) of the Conflicts of Law.11 While the Court has not stated
whether these approaches are constitutionally required, the Court’s
existing constitutional jurisprudence strongly suggests that a marriage
valid in the state of domicile at the time of the marriage must be
recognized throughout the country.
Section A of Part I discusses right-to-marry cases where the
plaintiffs married in one state and then brought suit against their
domiciles, claiming that their domicile’s refusal to permit the couples
to marry (or to recognize the marriage they had celebrated elsewhere)
violated federal constitutional guarantees. Section B addresses the
9. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-106 (West) (“All marriages between . . .
first cousins are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void.”) with 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/212(a)(4) (2014) (prohibiting marriages between first cousins unless both parties are older than
50 years of age or one party is permanently and irreversibly sterile) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 363-101 (West) (prohibiting marriages between various ancestral relations, including between linear
ancestors or descendants of a party, and between a grandparent and a grandchild).
10. Cf. Damien Rios, Estate and Tax Planning Considerations for Same-Sex Couples, 39 EST.
PLAN. 9, 11 (May 2012) (“Not only is the same-sex [not legally recognized] spouse not legally
permitted to make medical decisions for the incapacitated individual, unless appointed to do so
under a health care proxy, but he or she might not be permitted to visit the individual in
the hospital during visiting hours that are restricted to family members.”).
11. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121 (explaining that state and local law
determines the validity of a marriage); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283.
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Restatements’ positions on when marriages validly celebrated in one
state must be recognized in another. Section C includes a discussion of
the effect of evasion statutes. Section D discusses the extent to which
the Court has interpreted the Constitution to incorporate the
Restatements’ positions. The Restatements not only discuss whether
marriages validly celebrated elsewhere must be recognized, but also
whether states must permit couples to enjoy the incidents of marriage.
Section E explains the difference between status recognition and
incident enjoyment, as well as some of the constitutional limitations on
the power of states to refuse to permit married couples to enjoy those
incidents. Finally, Section F discusses how federal right to travel
guarantees may affect the constitutionality of state practices regarding
marital status and the enjoyment of marriage benefits.
A. Right to Marry Caselaw
Three of the important cases establishing the contours of the
Constitution’s fundamental right to marry involved individuals who
had married outside of their state of domicile12 and then challenged
their domicile’s refusal to recognize their union.13 Because local
statutes prohibited the respective couples from marrying at home,14
they wed in states permitting their marriages and then claimed that
their respective domicile’s prohibition violated constitutional

12. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (“Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur
decided to commit to one another, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their mutual
promise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. It was difficult
for Arthur to move, and so the couple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained
on the tarmac in Baltimore.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 n.9 (1978) (“Counsel for
appellee informed us at oral argument that appellee was married in Illinois some time after
argument on the merits in the District Court, but prior to judgment.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (“In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and
Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws.”).
13. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (citing MICH. CONST., ART. I, § 25; KY. CONST. § 233A;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01) (Lexis 2008); TENN. CONST., ART. XI, § 18) (“These cases
come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union
between one man and one woman.”); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382 (“[A]ppellee’s individual claim is
unaffected, since he is still a Wisconsin resident and the Illinois marriage is consequently void
under the provisions of §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5).”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (“Other central provisions
in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between ‘a
white person and a colored person’ without any judicial proceeding.”).
14. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (discussing Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee
provisions which barred same-sex marriage); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375 (describing the Wisconsin
statute §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) which made it very difficult if not impossible for certain indigents to
marry); Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (describing Virginia statutes §§ 20-57, 20-58, and 20-59 which barred
interracial marriage).
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guarantees.15 In each case, the Court discussed why the right to marry
is of such “fundamental importance”16 and then held that the state
could not prohibit the marriage at issue.17 These holdings did nothing
to clarify the conditions, if any, under which the Constitution might
permit a state of domicile to refuse to recognize a marriage valid under
the law of the state of celebration.
The first case, Loving v. Virginia, involved an interracial couple
domiciled in Virginia.18 Because Virginia had a statute prohibiting
interracial marriages, the couple traveled to the District of Columbia to
be lawfully married.19 At the time, Virginia also had an evasion statute,
which specified that interracial couples who married in another state
would be treated as if they had tried to marry in-state, and the marriage
would be void.20
The Loving Court did not address whether the marriage validly
celebrated in the District of Columbia had to be recognized in Virginia,
instead holding that Virginia itself was not free to prohibit interracial
marriage.21 While much of the opinion discussed why Virginia’s ban
violated equal protection guarantees, the Court also addressed the right
to marry itself, describing marriage as “one of the ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”22
15. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (discussing the claim that the state’s statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 376 (same); Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (same).
16. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. See also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (discussing “the
transcendent importance of marriage”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (describing marriage as a “vital
personal right”).
17. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (“[S]ame-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry in all States.”); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“When a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.”); id. at 390–91 (“The statutory classification created by §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) . . . cannot
be justified by the interests advanced in support of it.”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
18. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4 (“If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose
of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards
return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife . . . the marriage shall be governed by the
same law as if it had been solemnized in this State.” (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-58)); see also
id. (“Virginia [statute] . . . § 20-57 . . . automatically voids all marriages between ‘a white person
and a colored person’ without any judicial proceeding.”).
21. Id. at 12 (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
22. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (“The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
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Given the importance of marriage and the lack of a “legitimate
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” to
justify the ban,23 Virginia’s prohibition did not pass constitutional
muster.24 This meant that Virginia was constitutionally required to both
permit interracial couples to celebrate their marriages in Virginia and
to recognize interracial marriages celebrated outside of Virginia, so
long as the marriages met Virginia’s other marriage requirements.25 In
holding that this particular marriage ban was unconstitutional, there
was no need for the Court to address whether a marriage celebrated in
the District of Columbia in accord with local law had to be recognized
in Virginia, notwithstanding a valid Virginia law prohibiting the
celebration of such marriages.
The second right-to-marry case, Zablocki v. Redhail, involved a
Wisconsin law prohibiting noncustodial parents from marrying if they
were unable to meet their child support obligations.26 Like Virginia,
Wisconsin had an evasion statute, although this one treated all
marriages prohibited under local law as void, even if those marriages
had been validly celebrated in another state.27
When Redhail sought to marry his pregnant fiancée, he owed over
$3700 in back child support.28 Barred from marrying in Wisconsin,
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”)). The Court’s glowing description of marriage echoed
its opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut two years earlier: “Marriage is . . . intimate to the degree
of being sacred [and] . . . is an association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . .
a bilateral loyalty . . . [that] is . . . for as noble a purpose as any involved in [the Court’s] prior
decisions.” 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
24. See id. at 12 (“To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law.”).
25. Virginia also required, for example, that the marriage participants be of age, VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-48 (West 2016), not too closely related by affinity or consanguinity, id. § 20-38.1(a), and
competent to consent, id. § 20-45.1(b).
26. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (“Under the challenged statute, no
Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court
order.”).
27. Id. at 382 n.9 (“[H]e is still a Wisconsin resident and the Illinois marriage is consequently
void under the provisions of §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5).” (citing State v. Mueller, 171 N.W.2d 414 (Wis.
1969))). See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (1) (West) (“If any person residing and intending to
continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the
laws of this state goes into another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or
declared void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this state
with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.”).
28. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 379 (“[A]ppellee and the woman he desired to marry were
expecting a child in March 1975 and wished to be lawfully married before that time . . . . [A]s of
December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700.”).
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Redhail and his fiancée wed in Illinois.29 This case seemed to place the
constitutionality of a domicile’s refusal to recognize a marriage validly
celebrated elsewhere squarely before the Court. To see why, assume
that Wisconsin’s law preventing domiciliaries from marrying if they had
outstanding child support obligations passed constitutional muster. In
that event, a marriage celebrated in accord with the law of the state of
celebration (Illinois) would nonetheless not have to be recognized in
the domicile (Wisconsin), assuming that Wisconsin’s refusal to
recognize the marriage passed constitutional muster.
Rather than address the interstate recognition issues, the Zablocki
Court focused on the importance of the right to marry, noting that it
makes “little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other
matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”30 The
Court then held that the Constitution precluded Wisconsin from
prohibiting marriages of individuals who had unpaid child support
obligations.31 As had been true in Loving, the Zablocki holding
eliminated the conflict between the laws of the states of celebration and
domicile, obviating any need to address whether the Constitution
would require Wisconsin to recognize a marriage prohibited locally
when that marriage had been celebrated in accord with the law of a
neighboring state.
Obergefell v. Hodges, another right to marry case, involved a
challenge to same-sex marriage bans in Ohio and other states.32 James
Obergefell and John Arthur, Ohio domiciliaries, celebrated a marriage
in Maryland, which permitted same-sex marriage.33 Ohio refused to
recognize the marriage,34 not because of an evasion statute, but because

29. Id. at 382 n.9 (“Counsel for appellee informed us at oral argument that appellee was
married in Illinois some time after argument on the merits in the District Court, but prior to
judgment.”).
30. Id. at 383–84, 386.
31. See id. at 391 (affirming the lower court’s decision to invalidate the state’s prohibition).
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“These cases come from Michigan,
Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee . . . . The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed
in another State, given full recognition.”).
33. Id. at 2594 (“[T]hey traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was
legal . . . . [T]he couple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained on the tarmac in
Baltimore.”).
34. Id. at 2594–95 (“Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse
on Arthur’s death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even in death . . . .
Obergefell . . . brought suit to be shown as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.”).
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Ohio had a constitutional amendment preventing the celebration or
recognition of same-sex marriages.35
Like its predecessor Courts, the Obergefell Court extolled the
importance of marriage:
Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers
unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm.
Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found
alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons.
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our
most profound hopes and aspirations.36

The Obergefell Court held that federal constitutional guarantees
preclude states from prohibiting same-sex marriage.37 As in Loving38
and Zablocki,39 this meant there was no longer a conflict between the
laws of the states of celebration and domicile.
However, part of the Obergefell analysis did focus on the individual
harms that might be caused by a state’s refusal to recognize a marriage
valid elsewhere.40 “Being married in one State but having that valid
marriage denied in another,” the Court explained, “is one of ‘the most
perplexing and distressing complication[s]’ in the law of domestic
relations.”41 The Court noted that numerous foreseeable difficulties
might occur. For example, “even an ordinary drive into a neighboring
State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event
of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state lines.”42 Such
“recognition bans inflict substantial and continuing harm.”43 The Court
did not address which, if any, state interests would be sufficiently
weighty to justify that substantial and continuing harm, instead merely
noting that no interests had been articulated in the case at hand that
would justify this particular ban.44
35. See OHIO CONST. ART. XV, § 11 (held unconstitutional by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015)) (“Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall
not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”).
36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
37. Id. at 2607 (“The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”).
38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
41. Id. (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 (1942)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2608 (“[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-
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In the cases discussed above, the Court held that states may not
prohibit marriage based on the races,45 poverty,46 or sexes of the
parties.47 However, other marriage limitations remain, such as those
based on the age of a contracting party,48 which means that certain
marriages are still permitted in some jurisdictions but not in others. In
such situations—where state laws differ about which marriages are
permitted—some method is necessary to determine whether a
particular marriage is valid. The Restatements (First and Second) of the
Conflict of Laws offer guidelines to develop such a method, although
the Restatement position is only persuasive49 unless it has been adopted
by a State.50
sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”). Suppose that
a state refused to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere even though such marriages
could be contracted within the state. Such a policy would be difficult to justify. For example, a
state could not justify such a policy by claiming that it wanted its domiciliaries to spend their
wedding dollars at home rather than in other states, because such a policy would violate dormant
commerce clause guarantees. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624 (1978) (“Discriminatory laws motivated by ‘simple economic protectionism’ are subject to a
‘virtually per se rule of invalidity.”)).
45. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
46. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978).
47. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
48. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-102 (B) (2018) (“Persons who are under sixteen
years of age shall not marry.”); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 123 (a) (West 2018) (“No individual
under the age of 18 shall be granted a marriage license.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-5 (West)
(allowing 17 year old individuals to marry if “each individual who is less than eighteen (18) years
of age receives the consent required by IC 31-11-2,” and the individuals are not otherwise
prohibited from marrying each other.); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(a) (West) (stating
that individuals 16 or 17 years old may not marry unless the individual “has the consent of a parent
or guardian and the parent or guardian swears that the individual is at least 16 years old,” or,
absent consent, either party provides a certificate from a physician or nurse stating that “the
woman is pregnant or has given birth to a child”); id. § 2-301(C) (“An individual under the age of
15 may not marry.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.02 (West 2013); (“A person of the full age of 16
years may, with the consent of the person’s legal custodial parents, guardian, or the court . . .
receive a license to marry, when . . . the person’s application for a license and consent for civil
marriage of a minor form is approved by the judge of the district court of the county in which the
person resides.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:4 (2019) (“No person below the age of 16 years
shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage, and all marriages contracted by such persons
shall be null and void.”).
49. Cf. Myhre v. Hessey, 9 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Wis. 1943) (“In considering whether . . . [a
particular position] should be adopted as the settled law of this state it should be noted that
the Restatement of the Law, Torts, is apparently contrary to it.”).
50. See, e.g., Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Ariz. 1985) (“In determining
which state’s law to apply, this Court has adopted the rules embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts (1971) to analyze and solve conflicts problems arising in Arizona.”). But see
Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 2003) (“[T]he United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit . . . certified the following question of Georgia law to this Court: Whether
a court applying Georgia conflicts of laws rules [must] follow the language of Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 187(2) . . . . Because the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws has
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B. The Restatements
Because the United States is such a mobile society,51 individuals
who cannot marry in one state may go to another to marry. These
individuals might then (1) return to live in their domicile with its
stricter marriage laws, (2) remain in the state with the more forgiving
marriage laws, or (3) move to some third state.
The Restatements (First and Second) of the Conflict of Laws offer
analyses of the conditions under which states should recognize
marriages celebrated elsewhere, even if those marriages are subject to
local prohibitions that do not violate constitutional guarantees.52 The
Restatements balance a number of considerations, including each state’s
interests in having its procedures followed and preventing its
domiciliaries from contracting marriages which violate an important
public policy of the state.53 While there are some differences between
the two Restatements,54 both suggest that only the law of certain states
will determine the validity of a marriage,55 and that marriages valid
when celebrated should be recognized throughout the country.
With certain important exceptions,56 the First Restatement suggests
that marriages valid where celebrated should be recognized

never been adopted in Georgia, and because we continue to refuse to enforce contractual rights
which contravene the policy of Georgia, we answer in the negative.”).
51. Hilary K. Josephs, Book Review - Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative,
International: Cases and Materials, 60 LA. L. REV. 1123, 1123–24 (2000) (“The United States is . . .
a highly mobile society.”); Stephen Rauls, Family Law-Guardianship - the Uniform Adult
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act: A Uniform Solution to an Arkansas
Problem, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 75, 75 (2010) (“[T]the United States is a
very mobile society.”). But see Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012) (“[R]ecent studies
have found that the United States is a far less mobile society than many European countries.”).
52. Both Restatements are discussed here because courts may “[c]hoose whether they will
adopt a particular Restatement.” Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is It Time for the Restatement of
Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195, 196 (2009).
53. Note that both the states of celebration and domicile have interests in having their laws
followed. See infra notes 62–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatements’ positions on
which state’s law governs marriage formalities and which state’s law governs the situations in
which a marriage prohibited in the domicile may nonetheless be permitted in the state of
celebration).
54. Compare FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 132 (c) (discussing the conditions under
which interracial marriages need not be recognized), with SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5
(omitting discussion because Loving had already been decided four years prior to the publication
of the SECOND RESTATEMENT).
55. See infra notes 58–59 and 63–70 and accompanying text (suggesting that a marriage’s
validity will be determined in light of the laws of the states of celebration and domicile at the time
of the marriage’s celebration).
56. See infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
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everywhere.57 In determining whether a marriage is valid, the law of the
state of celebration will be used to assess:
1. the necessity of a license;
2. the necessity of a formal ceremony;
3. the person to perform the ceremony;
4. the manner of the performance of the ceremony;
5. the capacity of the parties to enter into the contract of marriage;
6. the necessity of physical examination before marriage.58

Similarly favorable to the state of celebration, the First Restatement
also explains the conditions under which common law marriages will
be recognized: “A marriage without any formal ceremony is valid
everywhere if the acts alleged to have created it took place in a state in
which such a marriage is valid.”59
The First Restatement specifies two exceptions to the rule that
marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere. Section 131
addresses cases where both parties to a divorce have been barred from
remarrying,60 while Section 132 addresses certain specific marriages
that are deemed void by the domicile of at least one of the parties.61
Section 132 reads:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either
party, though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration
have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following
cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that
their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,

57. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121 (“Except as stated in §§ 131 and 132, a
marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the
contract of marriage takes place are complied with.”).
58. Id. § 121(e).
59. Id. § 123.
60. Id. § 131. For example, both parties might be prohibited from marrying third parties for
some defined period. E.g., 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-23 (a) (West 2016) (“No judgment for
a divorce shall become final and operative until three (3) months after the trial and decision.”).
A state might do this in the hopes that the parties might reconcile. See Coe v. Coe, 303 S.E.2d 923,
925 (Va. 1983) (“The statutorily mandated waiting period . . . between the time separation occurs
and the time a final decree of divorce can be granted is designed primarily to give the parties an
opportunity to reconcile and to determine if they desire the separation to be final.”).
61. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 132.
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(c) marriage between persons of different races where such
marriages are at the domicil regarded as odious,62
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes
void even though celebrated in another state.63

In these cases, the Restatement privileges the law of the domicile at
the time of celebration, at least where the marriage is thought to
undermine a very important state interest (which is normally reflected
by the state’s having made such marriages void).64 After Loving, states
may not claim that interracial marriages violate an important public
policy, but the rest of Section 132 remains persuasive authority.65
The Second Restatement also privileges the law of the domicile at
the time of the marriage’s celebration.66 According to this Restatement,
like the First, a marriage contracted in accord with the law of the state
of celebration will be valid in other states unless that marriage violates
an important public policy of the domicile at the time of the marriage.67
However, the Second Restatement includes some further details when
deciding which state’s law to apply. For example, if the public policy at
issue involves formality requirements such as a license or formal
ceremony, the law of the state of celebration will apply unless the
marriage’s invalidity “is required by the strong policy of another state
which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage,”68 i.e., the spouses’ domicile. With
regards to common law marriage, the Second Restatement suggests that
whether a common law marriage will be recognized is a decision
involving the formality requirements of marriage,69 which means that
the law of the state where the marriage is contracted will govern unless
62. This provision is no longer good law. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
63. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 132. Some marriages are merely prohibited and
are not treated as void—those marriages would be subject to recognition if validly celebrated
elsewhere. E.g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934).
64. See Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and
the Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 294–95 (1997) (noting that when states declare a
marriage void, they indicate that the marriage violates an important public policy of the state).
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
66. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283 cmt. i (“Upholding the validity of
marriage in such a case by application of the validating rule of the state of domicil would seem
required . . . .”).
67. See id. § 283(2) (“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage
at the time of the marriage.”).
68. Id. § 283 cmt. f.
69. See id. § 283 cmt. g (“Whether a marriage can be created without formal ceremony is a
question relating to formalities.”).

MARRIAGE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

116

4/17/2020 11:45 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 15

the recognition of such a marriage violates a strong policy of the
parties’ domicile.70
C. Evasion Statutes
Evasion statutes are laws that are designed to prevent domiciliaries
from avoiding (or evading) the marriage prohibitions contained in local
law by crossing a border, marrying in accord with another state’s law,
and then returning home claiming to have a valid marriage.71 The First
Restatement discusses evasion statutes in Sections 121 and 134. Section
121 discusses an evasion statute that a state of celebration might have:
A statute in the state where the marriage is celebrated may provide
that no marriage shall be contracted therein by one domiciled and
intending to continue to be domiciled in another state if such
marriage would be void if contracted in such other state and that
every marriage celebrated in violation of such provision shall be null
and void.72

Section 132 discusses a statute that a state of domicile might have:
A statute may provide in specific words or be so interpreted that if
parties domiciled in a state and intending to continue to be
domiciled there, who are disabled or prohibited from contracting
marriage under the law of the state of the domicil, shall go into
another state and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared
void by the law of the domicil, such marriage shall be null and void
for all purposes in the state of the domicil, with the same effect as
though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in the state
of the domicil. A marriage contracted under the circumstances
referred to in such a statute will be void everywhere under the rule
stated in this Section, clause (d).73

Thus, the First Restatement recognizes that a domicile with an
evasion statute may refuse to recognize any marriage that is treated as

70. See id. (“If the acts relied upon to create the marriage meet the requirements of the state
where the acts took place, the marriage will not be held invalid for lack of the necessary
formalities except in the unusual circumstances stated in Comment f.”).
71. See King v. Klemp, 57 A.2d 530, 536 (N.J. Ch. 1947) (“Such statutes generally declare
that if either of the contracting parties residing and intending to continue to reside in the state,
goes into another jurisdiction with intent to evade the marriage laws of the domiciliary state,
such marriage is void.”); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving
Credit Where It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 355 (1997) (“Not wanting their domiciliaries to be
able to avoid their marriage laws by simply marrying in another state, states have passed evasion
statutes.”).
72. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121(g).
73. Id. § 132(e).
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prohibited and void in the domicile,74 even if the marriage was validly
celebrated elsewhere. Several illustrations are offered so that the
meaning of this section is clear. In each of the illustrations, the law of
the domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration is considered.75
That said, a state need not have an evasion statute to refuse to
recognize a marriage celebrated elsewhere.76 Thus, a marriage void in
the domicile does not to be recognized even though (1) the marriage
was celebrated elsewhere in accord with local law, and (2) the domicile
does not have an evasion statute specifically precluding that marriage.77
However, merely because a marriage is treated as void under local law
does not establish that such a marriage will not be recognized if validly
celebrated elsewhere—many states have general policies of
recognizing marriages that are valid where celebrated, even if the
marriage is void in the domicile.78
Sometimes, a state’s evasion statute in effect announces that
marriages violating an important public policy of the state will not be
recognized even if those marriages are validly celebrated elsewhere.79
74. A state might disallow a marriage by either prohibiting it or by making it voidable or
void. As a general matter, a prohibited or voidable marriage is considered less offensive to public
policy than a void marriage. See Strasser, supra note 71, at 353 (“Just as voidable marriages are
not viewed as particularly odious and thus not the kind of marriages which the state should refuse
to recognize if validly celebrated elsewhere, so too prohibited (but not void) marriages are
viewed as less odious to public policy than void marriages.”).
75. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, illus. 1-3. See also id. § 134 cmt. a (“Wherever a
particularly strong policy of the state of the domicil at the time of the marriage is concerned, the
validity of the marriage may be involved under the rule stated in § 131 and 132.”).
76. Strasser, supra note 71, at 355 (“[T]hese statutes were unnecessary insofar as they were
designed to justify the refusal to recognize a marriage void in the domicile but legally celebrated
elsewhere.”).
77. See First Nat. Bank in Grand Forks v. N. Dakota Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 68 N.W.2d
661, 663 (N.D. 1955) (citing McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936)) (“A state has the
prerogative to regulate by legislation the marital status of its own citizens domiciled therein to the
extent of prohibiting certain marriages upon the ground of public policy and may give effect to
such prohibition in nullifying a marriage performed in violation thereof though solemnized in
another state.”).
78. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2017) (“A marriage contracted outside this state
that would be valid by laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in
California.”); Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing a first cousin
marriage celebrated in Tennessee by an Indiana domiciliary, notwithstanding that such a marriage
was void in the domicile); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1958) (recognizing
validity of a first-cousin marriage validly celebrated elsewhere even though such a marriage would
be void if celebrated in Ohio).
79. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/216 (2004) (“[I]f any person residing and intending
to continue to reside in this state and who is a person with a disability or prohibited from
contracting marriage under the laws of this state, shall go into another state or country and there
contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be
null and void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though such prohibited marriage
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When there is such a statute, a court would be less likely to interpret
state policy as favoring the recognition of a marriage valid where
celebrated even though void in the domicile, precisely because the
legislature had expressly stated that such marriages should not be
recognized.80
A state need not reserve its evasion statute for those marriages that
are void in the domicile.81 Instead, a state might refuse to recognize any
marriage celebrated elsewhere by its domiciliaries if that marriage is
prohibited locally.82 In effect, adopting an evasion statute voiding any
marriage that cannot be celebrated within the state suggests that
domiciliaries of that state who attempt to evade local marriage law by
going elsewhere to marry have thereby violated an important public
policy of their state. Such a state implicitly considers the evasion itself
as violating an important public policy, which the state presumably
views as adequate justification to refuse to recognize the marriage even
if the marriage itself does not violate an important public policy.83
D. Marital Status Recognition Caselaw
Both Restatements suggest that a marriage valid in the domicile at
the time of the marriage must be recognized in subsequently acquired
domiciles. However, a Restatement position does not bind a particular
state unless the state has adopted that position.84 Further, a legislature

had been entered into in this state.”).
80. See, e.g., Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d at 360 (citing State v. Yoder, 130 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1911)
(“A marriage contract is a nullity ab initio only where expressly so declared by statute. In such a
case, it is absolutely void, requiring no judicial decree for its dissolution.”)). See also Strasser,
supra note 71, at 355 (“When an evasion statute has been passed, courts are less able to argue that
the legislature’s intent is unclear and that therefore the marriage legally celebrated elsewhere
should be recognized by the domicile. The statute specifies which marriages, legally celebrated
elsewhere, should nonetheless not be recognized in the domicile.”).
81. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.04(1) (West 1979) (“If any person residing and intending
to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under
the laws of this state goes into another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited
or declared void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this
state with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.”).
82. See In re Estate of Toutant, 633 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating the
marriage of Wisconsin domiciliaries that had been celebrated within six months of the divorce of
one of parties, in violation of WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.04, notwithstanding that the state of
celebration, Texas, did not have a similar bar).
83. Cf. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283(2) (“A marriage which satisfies the
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as
valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”).
84. Michael Baram et al., Regulatory and Liability Considerations, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
5, 60 (2000) (statement of Gary Marchant) (“Each state has to independently adopt the
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or state supreme court could always decide to reject a position that had
previously been adopted.85 For example, a state that had been willing
to recognize any marriage valid in the domicile at the time of
celebration might subsequently adopt a different position because of
changes in public policy or later developments in that state’s law.86 This
ability of states to depart from the Restatements’ recommendations
illustrates the importance of establishing—as a constitutional matter—
which marriages must be recognized. Those seeking to understand
which marriages are constitutionally protected should consider the
Court’s divorce jurisprudence, where the Court has discussed the
conditions under which a marital status determination from one state
must be given credit in other states.
The Court has long recognized that states have an important
interest in regulating marriage and divorce. For example, it has noted
that the legislature “prescribes the age at which parties may contract to
marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of
both . . . and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.”87
But the Court’s acknowledgement that states have an important
interest in marriage and divorce does not help determine which state’s
law controls where marriages permitted in one jurisdiction are
prohibited in another.
The Court has suggested that the domicile has an especially
important interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries, as Haddock
v. Haddock88 illustrates. At issue in Haddock was the marital status of
John and Harriet Haddock.89 The couple wed in New York,90 although

new Restatement before it becomes binding in that state.”). See also Hedrick v. Rains, 477 S.E.2d
171, 172 (N.C. 1996) (“Except as specifically adopted in this jurisdiction, the Restatement should
not be viewed as determinative of North Carolina law.”).
85. See, e.g., Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219, 235 (Mich. 2006) (“[T]his
Court has the authority to overrule one of its prior decisions.”).
86. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Mo. 1985) (Blackmar, J., concurring in the result)
(citing Keener v. Dayton Elec. Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969)) (“Our Court has
been very willing to consider modern developments in the law of torts and to overrule or
distinguish earlier cases which seemed to stand in the way.”).
87. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
88. 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled in part by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
89. Id. at 564–65 (“The wife, a resident of the state of New York, sued the husband in that
state in 1899, and there obtained personal service upon him . . . . [T]he answer alleged that the
husband had, in 1881, obtained in a court of the State of Connecticut a divorce which was
conclusive.”).
90. Id. at 606 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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John claimed that Harriet had fraudulently induced him to marry her.91
In any event, they separated shortly after the wedding without
consummating the marriage and never lived together thereafter.92 John
established domicile in Connecticut93 while Harriet remained
domiciled in New York.94 After constructively serving Harriet with
notice,95 John secured a divorce from her in Connecticut,96 even though
she never appeared at the Connecticut proceeding.97 Harriet later sued
John for divorce in New York.98
The Haddock Court reasoned that because John had been
domiciled in Connecticut when securing his divorce from Harriet, his
marital status (no longer being married to Harriet) could not be
challenged in Connecticut. The Court wrote: “[W]here a court of one
State, conformably to the laws of such State . . . has acted concerning
the dissolution of the marriage tie, as to a citizen of that State, such
action is binding in that State as to such citizen[.]”99 At this time,100 the
domicile’s power over the marital status of its citizens was viewed as so
great that the state’s determination of its domiciliary’s marital status
was immune from a federal due process challenge.101
Connecticut’s power to change the marital status of one of its own
domiciliaries,102 however, did not extend to changing the marital status
of a non-domiciliary lacking ties to the state.103 Thus, while Connecticut

91. Id. at 564–65.
92. Id. at 606.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 564.
95. Id. at 566.
96. Id. at 606.
97. Id. at 565.
98. Id. at 564.
99. Id. at 569 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888)).
100. Note that this view has not withstood the test of time, and complainants can now bring
federal due process challenges to a state’s marriage restriction. See Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287, 306 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“If the actions of the Nevada court had
been taken ‘without due process of law,’ the divorces which it purported to decree would have
been without legal sanction in every state including Nevada.”).
101. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 569 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)) (“[T]he validity
of the judgment may not therein be questioned on the ground that the action of the State in
dealing with its own citizen concerning the marriage relation was repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution.”).
102. See id. at 572 (“[N]o question can arise . . . concerning the right of the State of
Connecticut . . . to give effect to the decree of divorce rendered in favor of the husband . . .
domiciled in that state . . . .”).
103. See id. (“[T]the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the wife . . . by virtue
of the domicil of the wife within the State or as the result of personal service upon her within its
borders.”).
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had the power to change John’s marital status, it did not have the power
to change the marital status of Harriet, who was a New York
domiciliary.104 John’s Connecticut divorce decree did not trigger full
faith and credit guarantees,105 and New York was free to grant Harriet
spousal support and a separation from bed and board.106 In other words,
New York was free to refuse to recognize that Connecticut had legally
ended the Haddocks’ marriage.107
Haddock represents great deference to the domicile’s power to
determine marital status, in that each domicile in certain circumstances
is permitted to make its own determination regarding its domiciliary’s
marital status. But this policy of deference to the domicile leads to
anomalous results where two married individuals are domiciled in
different states.
In Atherton v. Atherton, another marriage recognition case decided
shortly before Haddock, the Court suggested that the law would never
recognize a spouseless spouse:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony, by a court of competent jurisdiction, are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law.108

Although seemingly contradictory, Atherton and Haddock are
distinguishable. In Atherton, the divorce was granted in the state of

104. Cf. id. at 574 (“If the fact be that where persons are married in the State of New York
either of the parties to the marriage may, in violation of the marital obligations, desert the other
and go into the State of Connecticut, there acquiring a domicil, and procure a dissolution of the
marriage which would be binding in the State of New York as to the party to the marriage there
domiciled, it would follow that the power of the State of New York as to the dissolution of the
marriage as to its domiciled citizen would be of no practical avail.”).
105. Id. at 606 (“[T]he decree of the court of Connecticut rendered under the circumstances
stated was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the full
faith and credit clause.”). See also Sheila Jordan Cunningham, Jurisdiction in the Ex Parte
Divorce: Do Absent Spouses Have A Protected Due Process Interest in Their Marital Status?, 13
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 222 (1983) (“In upholding the denial of recognition to the Connecticut
decree, the Supreme Court did not emphasize the rights of the absent spouse whose marital status
was determined without her presence, but rather, emphasized the rights of the absent spouse’s
domiciliary state.”).
106. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 565.
107. See id. at 581 (suggesting that the Connecticut decree could but did not have to be
recognized by New York as a matter of comity).
108. 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901).
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marital domicile,109 whereas in Haddock it was not.110 According to the
Haddock Court, an ex parte divorce in the marital domicile is subject
to full faith and credit guarantees,111 whereas a divorce in a nonmarital
domicile lacking personal jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary spouse
is not.112
The Haddock approach is not without difficulty. Suppose, for
example, that John Haddock had remarried in Connecticut following
his Connecticut divorce, and then had moved with his new wife, Helen,
and their children to New York. Suppose further that John died and
both Harriet and Helen sought to administer the estate. New York
could decide that Harriet was still married to John, which would have
negated Helen’s marriage (and family) in the eyes of the law.113 As
Justice Holmes observed in his Haddock dissent, “[T]he decision . . . is
likely to cause considerable disaster to innocent persons and to
bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful
marriage[.]”114
The Court overruled Haddock in Williams v. North Carolina,115
illustrating that the interests of subsequent domiciles in enforcing their
marriage laws must give way to other interests.116 At issue in Williams
was whether North Carolina had to recognize divorce decrees issued in
109. Id. at 157. The place of marital domicile is the state where the married couple lives, with
the intention to remain there indefinitely. See In re Smidt’s Will, 295 N.Y.S. 227, 230 (Sur. 1937)
(citing In re Newcomb’s Estate, 84 N.E. 950, 954 (N.Y. 1908)).
110. Haddock, 201 U.S. 577 (“As the husband, after wrongfully abandoning the wife in New
York, never established a matrimonial domicil in Connecticut, it cannot be said that he took with
him the marital relation from which he fled to Connecticut.”).
111. Id. at 572.
112. Id. (“[I]t is apparent that the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
wife . . . by virtue of the domicil of the wife within the State or as the result of personal service
upon her within its borders.”). See also id. at 606 (“[T]he decree of the court of Connecticut
rendered under the circumstances stated was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State
of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause.”).
113. Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
343 (1948). In Andrews, Charles’s first wife, Kate, and his second wife, Annie, each sought to be
declared his lawful widow. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court, held that Charles’s divorce was void, which made his second marriage void
and which made Kate his lawful widow. See id. at 42 (“[W]e conclude that no violation of the due
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States arose from the action of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in obeying the command of the state statute, and
refusing to give effect to the decree of divorce in question.”).
114. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115. 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
116. See id. at 303–04 (“[T]he considerable interests involved, and the substantial and farreaching effects which the allowance of an exception would have on innocent persons, indicate
that the purpose of the full faith and credit clause and of the supporting legislation would be
thwarted to a substantial degree if the rule of Haddock v. Haddock were perpetuated.”).
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Nevada to individuals domiciled in North Carolina at the time the
divorce decrees were contested.117 The Court held that the decrees were
subject to full faith and credit,118 assuming that the Nevada court had
jurisdiction to grant the divorces.119 In so holding, the Williams Court
relied on the importance of domicile, explaining that “the power of a
state to alter the marital status of its domiciliaries . . . is dependent on
the relationship which domicil creates and the pervasive control which
a state has over marriage and divorce within its own borders.”120 But
the Court also held that once a court has granted a divorce to the party
domiciled there (assuming that the other party has been afforded
proper notice),121 that divorce decree triggers full faith and credit
guarantees, regardless of whether either party subsequently changes
domicile:
[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with the requirements
of procedural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled
in that state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we
cannot say its decree should be excepted from the full faith and
credit clause merely because its enforcement or recognition in
another state would conflict with the policy of the latter.122

Suppose that Margaret and Michael Salmon marry in New York
post-Williams. Michael abandons Margaret immediately after the
wedding and becomes a Connecticut domiciliary. A year and a half
later,123 he obtains a divorce after affording Margaret the requisite
notice. Under Williams, that divorce triggers full faith and credit
guarantees,124 and New York will be forced to recognize the divorce.

117. Id. at 290.
118. Id. at 303.
119. Id. at 302 (“[I]n this case we must assume that petitioners had a bona fide domicil in
Nevada, not that the Nevada domicil was a sham.”).
120. Id. at 300.
121. See id. at 298–99 (citing Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 172 (1901)) (“[E]ach state
by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage
can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though
the other spouse is absent . . . [as long as the notice afforded] meet[s] the requirements
of due process.”).
122. Id. at 303.
123. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-44(c)(1) (West 2018) (“A decree dissolving a
marriage or granting a legal separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties to the marriage
has been a resident of this state for at least the twelve months next preceding the date of the filing
of the complaint or next preceding the date of the decree.”).
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that once a court has granted a divorce
to a party domiciled in a certain state, that divorce decree triggers full faith and credit guarantees,
regardless of whether either of the formerly married parties subsequently changes domicile).
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Williams limits the power of New York (Margaret’s domicile in the
hypothesized example) to determine its domiciliary’s marital status.
The Williams Court understood the implications of its decision,
recognizing that the first domicile’s powers to determine the marital
status of its own domiciliaries and enforce its own divorce laws would
be undermined if the state were forced to give full faith and credit to a
subsequent domicile’s decree.125 However, the Court reasoned that an
analogous objection “goes to the application of the full faith and credit
clause to many situations.”126 In other words, states occasionally having
their policies undermined to some degree is an inherent effect of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. While this reality means that “one state’s
policy of strict control over the institution of marriage could be
thwarted by the decree of a more lax state,”127 the Court explained,
“[s]uch is part of the price of our federal system.”128
In Estin v. Estin,129 the Court detailed some of the reasons why
domiciles have an important interest in the marital status of their
domiciliaries:
Marital status involves the regularity and integrity of the marriage
relation. It affects the legitimacy of the offspring of marriage . . . .
The State has a considerable interest . . . in protecting the offspring
of marriages from being bastardized . . . . The State should have the
power to guard its interest in [its domiciliaries] by changing or
altering their marital status and by protecting them in that
changed status throughout the farthest reaches of the nation.130

In Estin, the Court decided that an order of spousal support issued
during a separation proceeding was enforceable even after a divorce
decree had been granted by another state,131 and the Court’s insights
are relevant in other contexts as well. If a marriage might subsequently
be invalidated in a different domicile, property interests and the
legitimacy of children would be at risk.132
125. Williams, 317 U.S. at 302 (“It is objected, however, that if such divorce decrees must be
given full faith and credit, a substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be
effected.”).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
130. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 542 (“This case . . . presents an important question . . . whether a New York decree
awarding respondent $180 per month for her maintenance and support in a separation proceeding
survived a Nevada divorce decree which subsequently was granted petitioner.”).
132. When discussing marriage annulments, both Restatements refer to the law of the
domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5,
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E. Limiting Enjoyment of the Incidents of Marriage
Even if a marriage is considered “valid” throughout the nation, a
state might still choose to deny certain couples some of the incidents or
benefits of that marriage. For example, the state might refuse to accord
to certain spouses a special status in tort or in medical decisionmaking.133 Because this ability might permit states to undermine the
requirement that they recognize marriages validly celebrated
elsewhere, the power to deny the incidents of marriage must also be
addressed here.
The Restatements’ policies regarding the recognition of marital
status and the enjoyment of marital incidents strike a compromise by
precluding states from refusing to recognize the couple’s marital status,
while allowing states to deny the enjoyment of some of the incidents of
marriage.134 The Constitution imposes some limits on the power of
states to deny marital couples the enjoyment of these incidents,135
although the contours of those limitations have not been fully
developed.
The First Restatement suggests that while a marriage valid in the
states of celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage is valid in
all states,136 states may prohibit married couples from enjoying all the
incidents of marriage if their union violates an important public policy
of the state.137 For example, suppose that the state of celebration and
§ 286 (“The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the law which determines the validity
of the marriage.”); id. § 286 cmt. a (“For the law which determines the validity of a marriage, see
§ 283.”); id. § 283(2) (“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage
at the time of the marriage.”); FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 136 (“The law governing the
right to a decree of nullity is the law which determined the validity of the marriage with respect
to the matter on account of which the marriage is alleged to be null.”); id. § 132 (listing multiple
situations in which marriages against the law of the state of domicil of either party will be invalid,
even though the might comply with the law of the state of celebration).
133. Cf. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999) (discussing “a broad array of legal
benefits and protections incident to the marital relation, including access to a spouse’s medical,
life, and disability insurance, hospital visitation and other medical decisionmaking privileges,
spousal support, intestate succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory
protections”).
134. See infra notes 137–159 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 144–159 and accompanying text.
136. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121 (stating that “a marriage is valid
everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage
takes place are complied with”); id. § 132 (suggesting that the marriage will be valid as long as it
does not violate a very important public policy of the domicile at the time of the marriage).
137. See id. § 134 (“If any effect of a marriage created by the law of one state is deemed by
the courts of another state sufficiently offensive to the policy of the latter state, the latter state
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domicile recognizes polygamous unions. A man marries two women in
accord with the law of the domicile, and then moves to a state that does
not recognize polygamous unions. Under the First Restatement’s
approach, the latter state must recognize the marriage, but may refuse
to permit them all to live together.138 According to the First
Restatement, such a refusal does not constitute a rejection of the
marriage’s validity,139 although it would of course have important
implications for the family’s living arrangements. The Second
Restatement incorporates a similar approach.140
In Pavan v. Smith, the Court addressed whether Arkansas could
deny an incident of marriage to a same-sex couple: namely, having both
parents’ names on the birth certificate of a child born into the
marriage.141 The Court struck down Arkansas’s law “[b]ecause that
differential treatment infringes Obergefell’s commitment to provide
same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the States have
linked to marriage.’”142 By the same token, the Court would likely
strike down a state attempt to prevent a married same-sex couple from
living together. Indeed, Lawrence v. Texas precludes states from
prohibiting even non-marital same-sex couples from living together.143
It remains to be seen, however, whether Lawrence and Pavan would
preclude states from ever denying the enjoyment of any incidents of
marriage. For example, Lawrence expressly restricts its holding to
will refuse to give that effect to the marriage.”). See also Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right
to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1473 (2012) (“Under traditional
conflicts doctrine, while the place of celebration rule governed the validity of the marriage, courts
were allowed to look to local law to determine whether a married party should be entitled under
local law to enjoy a particular marital incident.”).
138. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 134 illus. 1 (“A, domiciled in state X, validly
marries B and C in X. By the law of Y, a polygamous marriage is void. A brings B and C to state
Y; Y may refuse to permit him to cohabit with them. A and B die; Y may grant a widow’s
allowance to C.”).
139. Id. § 134 cmt. a (“The action of the state in refusing to give effect to a marriage on the
ground stated in this Section does not deny the validity of the marriage, but precludes the
enjoyment within the state of some particular right or other interest incident to the marriage.”).
140. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 284 cmt. c (“A state will not give a particular
incident to a foreign marriage when to do so would be contrary to its strong local policy. The state
will not do so even though the marriage is valid in the state where it was contracted and even
though the incident in question would be granted in that state. A denial of a particular incident
on the grounds stated in this Comment does not deny the validity of the marriage.”).
141. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017).
142. Id. (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)).
143. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.”).
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adults,144 and thus does not preclude states from preventing an adult
from living with a minor whom he had married.145 Pavan’s reach might
also be limited in that Arkansas was trying to do something that even
the Restatement did not authorize.146
At issue in Pavan was an Arkansas provision denying the
enjoyment of an incident of marriage to couples who were permitted to
marry within the state.147 By contrast, the Restatement sections
permitting the denial of enjoyment of the incidents of marriage involve
marriages that were valid in the domicile when celebrated, but which
could not have been celebrated within the forum, e.g., the state where
the couple moved several years into their marriage.148 Pavan might thus
be interpreted in two different ways. The narrower interpretation is that
states may only deny the incidents of marriage to marriages that could
not be celebrated within the state. The broader interpretation is that
states may not deny the incidents of marriage to any valid marriage,
even if those marriages could not have been celebrated within that
state.
Citing Obergefell, the Pavan Court suggested that Arkansas was
engaging in “disparate treatment” of same-sex couples.149 If the Court
was thereby implying that the State did not have legitimate reasons to
support its differential treatment,150 then the Court may be leaving
open whether states are permitted to deny the incidents of marriage to
couples where doing so would not be demeaning or discriminatory151
but would instead promote legitimate state interests.

144. Id. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors.”).
145. See id. (noting that the present case also “does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused”).
146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
147. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2075. Here, the incident being denied was a birth certificate bearing
both parents’ names—in this case, two mothers. Id. at 2077.
148. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 134 cmt. b (noting that “the foreign marriage
would have been contrary to the statute of the forum had it occurred within the state”); see also
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 284 cmt. b (noting that “the marriage would have been
invalid in the state if it had been contracted there”).
149. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)).
150. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“Especially against a long history of disapproval of
their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and
subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this
unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”).
151. Cf. id. at 2602 (“It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central
institution of the Nation’s society.”).
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The Obergefell Court stated that the Constitution “does not permit
the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”152 That Court may have been
thinking either that the Constitution requires states to treat all
marriages similarly or that the Constitution permits states to make
distinctions among couples with respect to the enjoyment of the
incidents of marriage as long as those distinctions are reasonable.153 For
example, states might be able to deny the enjoyment of some of the
incidents of marriage to some of those couples who could not have
contracted the marriage within the state, i.e., those marriages that are
very offensive to local policy.154 Clarification of the constitutional
limitations on the power of states to restrict the enjoyment of the
incidents of marriage will have to await resolution in future cases.
F. Right to Travel
An additional constitutional consideration supports the contention
that a marriage valid in the domicile at the time of the marriage’s
celebration must be recognized throughout the nation. The Court has
recognized that a United States citizen’s “‘constitutional right to travel
from one State to another’ is firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence.”155 Individuals who have a valid marriage according to
their domicile’s law cannot be precluded from visiting other states.156
Indeed, the Obergefell Court noted that permitting one state to refuse
to recognize a marriage validly recognized in a sister domicile might
severely burden individual travel rights: “[E]ven an ordinary drive into

152. Id. at 2607.
153. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of . . . marriage must be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”).
154. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 134 cmt. b (“The mere fact that the foreign
marriage would have been contrary to the statute of the forum had it occurred within the state,
does not make it so offensive to local policy as to be refused enforcement.”); see also SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 284 cmt. b (“A state will give the same incidents to a marriage,
which is valid under the principles stated in § 283, that it gives to a marriage validly contracted
within its own territory, except as stated in Comment c. This is true even though the marriage
would have been invalid in the state if it had been contracted there. So a state will usually permit
the parties to a valid foreign marriage to cohabit within its territory even though the marriage
would have been invalid . . . .”).
155. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966)).
156. Id. at 500 (“The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases . . . protects the right of a citizen
of one State to enter and to leave another State, [and] the right to be treated as a welcome visitor
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State.”).
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a neighboring State to visit family or friends risks causing severe
hardship in the event of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state
lines.”157
The difficulty posed by a state’s refusal to recognize a marriage of
a visiting couple is avoided if only domiciles are permitted to refuse to
recognize marriages that had been valid at the time of celebration.
Suppose, for example, that a couple is domiciled in State D, celebrates
a marriage in State C, and visits friends in State V. Assume further that
the marriage is valid in states D and C. State V would be required to
recognize the marriage, even if the marriage violated an important
policy of that state. But if the couple decided to stay and make State V
their new domicile, the limitation on non-domiciles would not prevent
State V (their new domicile) from refusing to recognize their
marriage.158 Here, it is critical to note that the right to travel not only
protects the right of United States citizens to visit other states, but also
protects, “for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents,
the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”159
Both the Restatements and the Constitution would thus preclude a
subsequent domicile from refusing to recognize a marriage valid in the
state of domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration. As the Court
has explained, “[s]tates . . . do not have any right to select their
citizens.”160 Further, a state may not discourage individuals from
coming to that state merely because the state views those individuals
as undesirable. For example, a state is precluded from trying to deter
indigents from moving to that state,161 notwithstanding the state’s valid
interest in protecting the public fisc.162 So, too, a state is not permitted
to refuse to recognize marriages validly celebrated in other domiciles
as a way to deter those married couples from moving to the state. The
Restatements’ position reflects a similar approach—a subsequent
157. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299
(1942)).
158. Cf. Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602, 606 (C.C.E.D Va. 1879) (“That such a citizen [who
had entered into an interracial marriage in another domicile] would have a right of transit with
his wife through Virginia, and of temporary stoppage, and of carrying on any business here not
requiring residence [notwithstanding Virginia’s treating such marriages as void], may be
conceded, because those are privileges following a citizen of the United States.”).
159. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
160. Id. at 511.
161. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (“[T]he purpose of deterring the inmigration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year
waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible.”).
162. Id. at 633 (“We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity
of its programs.”).
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domicile may not deny the validity of a marriage valid in the couple’s
former domicile at the time of celebration, because a marriage valid in
the state of domicile at the time of celebration is valid throughout the
country.163 A marriage valid throughout the country would be valid in
the subsequently acquired domicile as well.
This result might seem counter-intuitive because such an approach
favors the couple who subsequently acquires a domicile over the couple
who had always lived there. Consider a couple, Riley Rivers and Reese
Rogers, precluded by Domicile1’s law from marrying. This couple has
always lived in that state. Even were they to visit another state and
marry in accord with local law, Domicile1 would not have to recognize
that marriage if that union violated an important public policy of the
state.164 Next consider Sandy Smith and Sasha Stockton, who live in
Domicile2 and marry in accord with local law. If Sandy and Sasha had
lived in Domicile1, they could not have married for the same reason
that Riley and Reese are precluded from marrying.
Suppose that a few years into their marriage Sandy and Sasha
receive very attractive job offers from an employer based in Domicile1.
Were Sandy and Sasha to accept those offers and move to Domicile1,
their marriage would have to be recognized because it had been valid
in the state of celebration and domicile at the time of its celebration.
Nonetheless, Riley and Reese would still be precluded from marrying
in Domicile1. Further, even if they temporarily visited Sandy and
Sasha’s former home (Domicile2) and celebrated their wedding there,
Domicile1 could legally refuse to recognize that marriage. It might seem
that Sandy and Sasha, who subsequently moved to Domicile1, are being
accorded better treatment than Riley and Reese, who had always lived
there.
As unfair as this outcome may seem, Riley and Reese are unlike
Sandy and Sasha in an important respect: the former couple never had
a valid marriage in their domicile, while the latter couple did. Sandy
and Sasha cannot constitutionally be forced to forego their valid
marriage as a price of traveling or moving to Domicile1, whereas Riley
and Reese would never have had a valid marriage.

163. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 865–66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“When the parties
moved from Virginia to Arizona in 1989, their marriage was valid under the laws of the state of
Arizona, not simply under Virginia law.” (emphasis in original)). Note, however, that a state
might be able to deny the couple the enjoyment of some of the incidents of marriage. See supra
note 134 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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The couple marrying in accord with the laws of the states of
celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage would have
justifiable and reasonable beliefs about the validity of their
marriage, whereas the couple evading their domicile’s law would be
on notice that their domicile at the time of the marriage might not
recognize the union even if it was validly celebrated elsewhere.165

Thus, there is an important sense in which Sandy and Sasha are not
comparable to Riley and Reese. Sandy and Sasha might well have made
a variety of decisions reasonably and justifiably relying on the validity
of their marriage. They would be more comparable to Charlie and
Casey, who had married at home in Domicile1 in accord with the law of
the state of celebration and domicile (i.e., Domicile1). Refusing to
recognize the marriage of Sandy and Sasha, who had married in accord
with the law of the state of celebration and domicile at the time of the
wedding (Domicile2) while recognizing the marriage of Charlie and
Casey would involve treating the citizens of another state (Domicile2)
less favorably than the citizens of Domicile1. Disfavoring couples with
valid marriages from other states implicates right to travel
guarantees.166
The right to travel precludes a state, absent some extremely
important justification, from imposing a severe burden on United
States citizens who wish to emigrate to that state.167 The Court has not
made clear which state interests, if any, would be sufficiently important
to justify refusing a couple the enjoyment of the incidents of marriage
if that couple’s marriage was valid in the couple’s domicile at the time
of celebration. Perhaps polygamous unions would present sufficiently
important interests to deny the enjoyment of the incidents of
marriage.168 Perhaps not.

165. Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and
the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 553, 575 (2000).
166. Cf. Strasser, supra note 64, at 307 (“[A] law which would void one’s marriage validly
celebrated in another state would be a serious deterrent to travel, given that marriage involves
such a fundamental interest.”).
167. Cf. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (“[B]ecause this classification
impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed right of interstate travel, it was to be judged by the
standard of whether it promoted a compelling state interest.”).
168. Cf. supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that some state interests
might be sufficiently important to allow a state to deny the incidents of a marriage).
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II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SELECTED STATE
RECOGNITION PRACTICES
Both Restatements suggest that a marriage valid in the domicile at
the time of the marriage is valid throughout the country. The Court has
emphasized the interests of the domicile in assuring that its marital
status determinations are respected throughout the nation. In the
divorce context, the Court has made clear that the interest of
subsequent domiciles in determining marital status must give way to
considerations such as the individual interests implicated in marriage
and the state interests in being part of a federal system. Further, the
fundamental interest in marriage is abridged when individuals are
forced to surrender their marriages as a price of entering a state.
Additionally, right to travel guarantees limit the power of subsequent
domiciles to deny a marriage’s validity and, perhaps, the enjoyment of
certain incidents of marriage. Were the Court to expressly embrace
these constitutional limitations, some state recognition practices with
respect to common law marriage and to marriages involving individuals
closely related by consanguinity or affinity might need to be modified.
A. Common Law Marriage
Several states still recognize common law marriage,169 while other
states not only prohibit such marriages but also treat them as void.170
Given this divergence of practice and the degree to which certain states
believe common law marriage to be contrary to public policy,171 it
would be helpful to know the conditions under which states must
recognize such marriages if contracted elsewhere, even assuming that
states may constitutionally prohibit their being contracted locally.
When permitted, a common law marriage may be contracted where
two parties agree to be married, hold themselves out to the community

169. Bryan E. Gates, Filing Status, 2 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-ABRIDGED &
ANNOTATED March 2019 Update, § 4.19.14.6.4 (“The states that recognize common law
marriages are CO, IA, KS, MT, OK, RI, SC, TX, UT and the District of Columbia.”).
170. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-5 (West) (“A marriage is void if the marriage is a
common law marriage that was entered into after January 1, 1958.”); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.01 (West) (“A lawful civil marriage may be contracted only when a license has been
obtained as provided by law and when the civil marriage is contracted in the presence of two
witnesses and solemnized by one authorized, or whom one or both of the parties in good faith
believe to be authorized, so to do. Marriages subsequent to April 26, 1941, not so contracted shall
be null and void.”).
171. Cf. Hesington v. Hesington’s Estate, 640 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting
that “§ 451.040.5 expressly declares that ‘common-law marriages hereafter contracted shall
be null and void’” (emphasis in original)).
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as married, and are capable of contracting a marriage.172 There are some
differences among states permitting such marriages to be contracted;
for example, whether a common law marriage will be presumed once
an impediment to its formation has been removed.173 But the focus here
is on whether a common law marriage contracted in a jurisdiction
permitting such unions must later be recognized by a jurisdiction that
does not permit such marriages to be contracted. State legislatures can
specify by statute whether common law marriages can be contracted
within the state, and whether common law marriages contracted
elsewhere will be recognized.174 However, if a state legislature has not
spoken directly to either or both of those issues, courts must clarify
state law.
Two cases, Hewitt v. Hewitt175 and Marvin v. Marvin,176 are helpful
when examining different state attitudes about common law marriage.
Hewitt is thought to represent strong disagreement with the recognition
of common law marriages, while Marvin is thought to represent the
opposite.177 At issue in Hewitt was whether Illinois would permit
Victoria Hewitt, who “lived with defendant Robert Hewitt from 1960
to 1975 in an unmarried, family-like relationship to which three

172. See Mark Strasser, Obergefell, Retroactivity, and Common Law Marriage, 9 NE. U.L.
REV. 379, 406–07 (2017) (“As a general matter, individuals domiciled in a state that permits
individuals to contract a common law marriage can establish such a union by: (1) treating each
other as spouses, (2) holding themselves out as spouses to the community, and (3) being free to
marry, e.g., not already having a living spouse.”).
173. Compare Callen v. Callen, 620 S.E.2d 59, 62 (S.C. 2005) (stating that after
the impediment is removed—in this case, one party’s existing marriage to a third person—”the
relationship is not automatically transformed into a common-law marriage,” but instead “remains
non-marital”) with Thomas v. Murphy, 107 F.2d 268, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“[T]he removal of an
impediment while parties continue to live together as husband and wife gives rise to a commonlaw marriage.”).
174. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.12(B)(1) (West) (“On and after October 10, 1991 . . .
common law marriages are prohibited in this state . . . .”); id. § 3105.12(B)(2) (“Common law
marriages that occurred in this state prior to October 10, 1991, and that have not been terminated
by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or annulment remain valid on and after October 10,
1991.”); id. § 3105.12(B)(3)(a-b) (“Common law marriages that satisfy all of the following remain
valid on and after October 10, 1991: They came into existence prior to October 10, 1991, or come
into existence on or after that date, in another state or nation that recognizes the validity
of common law marriages in accordance with all relevant aspects of the law of that state or
nation; They have not been terminated by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, annulment, or
other judicial determination in this or another state or in another nation.”).
175. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
176. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
177. Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared
Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1843 (1987) (“Because the California and Illinois supreme courts
had different fundamental conceptions of the nature of marriage and the law’s relation to it, their
analyses are diametrically opposed to one another.”).
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children have been born,” to recover “an equal share of the profits and
properties accumulated by the parties during that period.”178 The
Hewitts had begun their relationship in Iowa,179 although there was
some question whether the couple had lived together there.180
In denying Victoria Hewitt’s claim as a matter of public policy,181
the Hewitt court discussed the state’s view of common law marriage—
Illinois by statute denied recognition to common law marriages
contracted after 1905.182 After acknowledging the state’s policy, the
court nevertheless explained how the family seemed to meet the
requirements for common law marriage.183 “The parties expressly
manifested their present intent to be husband and wife; immediately
thereafter they assumed the marital status; and for many years they
consistently held themselves out to their relatives and the public at
large as husband and wife.”184 Apparently, the couple met in college.
She became pregnant, they agreed to become a family, and “the parties
immediately announced to their respective parents that they were
married and thereafter held themselves out as husband and wife.”185
The surprising part of the Hewitt opinion is that the court nowhere
addresses whether a valid common law marriage had been established
in Iowa.186 If one had been established, the question would have been
whether Illinois recognized common law marriages validly contracted
in other jurisdictions, and if not, whether the state was constitutionally
required to do so.
While Illinois’s refusal to permit common law marriages to be
contracted within the state has existed for over a century, the state does

178. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d. at 1205.
179. Id.
180. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ill. App. 1978), rev’d, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
1979) (noting at one point that “the parties immediately announced their marriage to their
respective parents, thereafter lived together as husband and wife” while noting at another point
that “[t]he trial court . . . found that the parties had never lived together in the State of Iowa”).
181. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211 (“[P]laintiff’s claims are unenforceable for the reason that
they contravene the public policy, implicit in the statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to
knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”).
182. Id. at 1209 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1977, ch. 40, par. 214) (“The Act also provides:
‘Common law marriages contracted in this State after June 30, 1905 are invalid.’”).
183. Id. at 1210 (“Plaintiff’s allegations disclose a relationship that clearly would have
constituted a valid common law marriage in this State prior to 1905.”).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1205.
186. The sole mention of Iowa in the opinion involved the court’s pointing out that Grinnell
College was located there. See id.
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recognize such marriages if validly contracted in a sister domicile.187
Many states have similar policies.188 If the Hewitt court had recognized
that a common law marriage was validly established in Iowa, then
Hewitt would likely not have stood for the proposition that common
law marriage and nonmarital cohabitation are grave threats to
traditional marriage,189 if only because the court would have held that
the common law marriage was valid.
The Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that a common law
marriage contracted in a state permitting them will not be recognized
in Illinois if the common law marriage was contracted while the parties
were Illinois domiciliaries.190 But this differs from the claim that a
common law marriage contracted in a different domicile should
nonetheless be void.191

187. See Bangaly v. Baggiani, 20 N.E.3d 42, 82 (Ill. App. 2014) (citing Allen v. Storer, 600
N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. 1992)) (“For instance, while common law marriages are not permitted
under Illinois law . . . common law marriages contracted in another state where they are valid are
recognized.”).
188. See, e.g., Brandon-Thomas v. Brandon-Thomas, 163 So. 3d 644, 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (citing Smith v. Anderson, 821 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)) (“Florida
also recognizes common law marriages entered into in states that accept common law marriages,
even though Florida itself does not recognize common law marriages contracted for in Florida
after 1968.”); Raum v. Rest. Assocs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 347–48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(Rosenberger, J., dissenting) (citing Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y.
1980)) (“While New York has not recognized common-law marriages created in New York since
1933, it will recognize such marriages if they were valid under the laws of the states where
contracted.”).
189. Cf. Kandoian, supra note 177, at 1845–46 (noting the Hewitt court’s view that common
law marriage undermined the institution of marriage). See also Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 921
(Ill. App. 1990) (citing Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211) (“In Hewitt, our supreme court held that it
would not grant mutual property rights to unmarried cohabitants because to do so would
reinstate common-law marriage and violate the public policy of this State.”).
190. Peirce v. Peirce, 39 N.E.2d 990, 993 (Ill. 1942) (“[T]he proposition that a common law
marriage is void in Illinois, even if performed in some other jurisdiction . . . is limited to the
situation where the parties whose marriage is sought to be upheld in Illinois were, at the time of
the marriage, domiciled in Illinois, although the marriage occurred in another State.”). It may be
that the trial court had based its decision on the Hewitts having been Illinois rather than Iowa
domiciliaries, see Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d at 456 (“[P]rior to June 1960, the parties were residents of
Illinois attending Grinnell College in Iowa.”), although the question would then be whether the
Hewitts had become domiciled in Iowa while schooling there. See In re Estate of Elson, 458
N.E.2d 637, 641–42 (Ill. App. 1983) (citing Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Tr., 51 N.E.2d 140, 144
(Ill. 1943)) (“To effect a change of domicile there must be an actual abandonment of the
first domicile, coupled with an intent not to return to it; also, physical presence must be
established in another place with the intention of making the last-acquired residence her
permanent home.”).
191. Allen v. Storer, 600 N.E.2d 1263, 1266–67 (Ill. App. 1992) (noting that these claims differ
and that Illinois only refuses to recognize common law marriages that had allegedly been
contracted by Illinois domiciliaries).
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Courts have sometimes claimed that they need not recognize a
common law marriage validly contracted in another domicile where
such a marriage contravenes an important public policy.192 To say that
a jurisdiction need not recognize a marriage contracted elsewhere does
not mean that the jurisdiction will not recognize a common law
marriage validly contracted elsewhere.193 Just as a domicile might
recognize out of comity the validity of a domiciliary’s marriage that had
been celebrated elsewhere even though that marriage could not have
been celebrated locally,194 a subsequent domicile might recognize out
of comity a marriage that was validly celebrated in a sister domicile
even though such a marriage could not have been celebrated in the
subsequent domicile.195 A state recognizing marriages validly
celebrated in other domiciles out of comity in effect reserves the right
not to recognize such marriages if they violate local public policy.196
However, the right to travel militates against the constitutionality of a
state refusal to recognize a ceremonial marriage valid in a sister
domicile at the time of the marriage.197 That same right also militates
against the constitutionality of a state refusal to recognize a common
law marriage validly contracted in a sister domicile. Right to travel
guarantees require the recognition of a common law marriage valid in
the domicile at the time it was contracted.
B. Incestuous Relations
States sometimes claim that they need not recognize marriages
validly celebrated in other domiciliary states if the parties are too
192. See Brinson v. Brinson, 96 So. 2d 653, 660 (La. 1957) (“But we are not bound to give
effect to a common law marriage, even if valid in the state where contracted, when it contravenes
the public policy of Louisiana and good morals generally.”).
193. See Matter of Lamb’s Estate, 655 P.2d 1001, 1003 (N.M. 1982) (citing Ferret v. Ferret,
237 P.2d 594, 602 (N.M. 1951)). There, the court wrote:
New Mexico applies the rule of comity, that the law of the place where the marriage is
performed governs the validity of that marriage. To determine whether a valid common
law marriage was formed in a foreign jurisdiction, it is therefore necessary to look to
the substantive law of that jurisdiction.
194. Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“As a matter of comity,
Indiana can choose to recognize Tennessee marriages between first cousins, even though such
a marriage could not be validly contracted between residents of Indiana.”). In Mason, John
Mason had been an Indiana domiciliary before the marriage and had returned to live in Indiana
with his wife three months after the marriage. Id. at 708.
195. See Brinson, 96 So. 2d at 659 (“[T]his Court has heretofore recognized, as a matter
of comity, common-law marriages valid where contracted.”).
196. See id. at 660 (“[W]e are not bound to give effect to a common law marriage, even if valid
in the state where contracted, when it contravenes the public policy of Louisiana and good morals
generally.”).
197. Supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
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closely related by affinity or consanguinity.198 All states prohibit, for
example, parents from marrying their children,199 and siblings from
marrying each other.200 States differ, however, in whether they permit
first cousins to marry.201
Arizona not only suggests that domiciliaries who marry their first
cousins elsewhere (without meeting a narrow exception202) will not
have their marriages recognized,203 but also suggests that after 1996
individuals who marry their first cousins in accord with their domicile’s
law will nonetheless not be recognized as married if they move to
Arizona.204 While the constitutional limitations articulated in the
preceding sections are compatible with Arizona’s refusal to recognize
its domiciliaries’ first cousin marriages celebrated in accord with the
law of the state of celebration, the Constitution does not permit

198. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112(A) (“Marriages valid by the laws of the place where
contracted are valid in this state, except marriages that are void and prohibited by § 25-101.”); see
also id. at § 25-101(A)-(B) (“Marriage between . . . first cousins, is prohibited and void.
Notwithstanding subsection A, first cousins may marry if both are sixty-five years of age or older
or if one or both first cousins are under sixty-five years of age, upon approval of any superior
court judge in the state if proof has been presented to the judge that one of the cousins is unable
to reproduce.”).
199. Christine M. Metteer, Some “Incest” Is Harmless Incest: Determining the Fundamental
Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 262, 273 (2000) (“[A]ll states continue to prohibit marriages between parents
and children.”).
200. Sonu Bedi, An Illiberal Union, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1081, 1135 (2018)
(suggesting that no state permits siblings to marry); see also Nicole Licata, Should Premarital
Counseling Be Mandatory As A Requisite to Obtaining A Marriage License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV.
518, 526 (2002) (“States have enacted laws that prohibit a person from marrying his or her
own sibling.”). But see Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (upholding validity of marriage
between brother and adoptive sister).
201. Compare ARK. CODE. ANN. 9-11-106(a) (West) (“All marriages between . . . first cousins
are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void”) with OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.020(2)
(West) (“The following marriages are prohibited; and, if solemnized within this state, are
absolutely void: . . . When the parties thereto are first cousins or any nearer of kin to each
other . . . except that when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not
prohibited or void.”); with TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-101 (West) (“Marriage cannot be contracted
with a lineal ancestor or descendant, nor the lineal ancestor or descendant of either parent, nor
the child of a grandparent, nor the lineal descendants of husband or wife, as the case may be, nor
the husband or wife of a parent or lineal descendant.”). See also Smith v. State, 6 S.W.3d 512, 518
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (“The revised statutes limited prohibitions against marriage to relatives
closer than first cousins.”).
202. Supra note 198.
203. In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Ariz. 1957) (“Marriages performed
outside the state which offend a strong public policy of the state of domicile will not be recognized
as valid in the domiciliary state.”).
204. See Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
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Arizona to refuse to recognize marriages validly celebrated in a sister
domicile.205
CONCLUSION
The Restatements (First and Second) of the Conflict of Laws suggest
that a marriage valid in the domicile at the time of its celebration is
valid throughout the country. Further, both individuals and states have
important interests implicated in the continuing recognition of such
marriages until ending because of death, divorce, or dissolution. Finally,
the United States Constitution protects the right to travel, and
individuals who must sacrifice their marriages as a price of emigrating
to other states have had their right to travel severely burdened. The
Constitution is best understood as requiring state recognition of
marriages valid in sister domiciles at the time of celebration.
The Restatements suggest that a state may withhold enjoyment of
certain incidents of marriage if a couple’s marriage violates an
important public policy of that state. However, the Court has not yet
made clear as a constitutional matter which, if any, state interests are
sufficiently important to justify such a denial. The right to travel
enjoyed by United States citizens includes the right to emigrate to
other states, and the Court has not explained whether states who would
deny the incidents of marriage to new domiciliaries, or even temporary
visitors, would thereby infringe upon the right to travel. Just as
surrendering one’s marriage would be a heavy price to pay for the
privilege of emigrating to another state, surrendering one’s right to live
with one’s spouse and children would be a heavy price, too. The Court
should explain whether and to what extent the Constitution protects
the validity of citizen’s marriages among the states, and the ability of
citizens to enjoy the incidents of marriage as they exercise their rights
to travel through or emigrate to other states in the Union.

205. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (suggesting that right to travel guarantees
would require the recognition of a common law marriage contracted in the domicile).

